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By 
ALAN S. KAYE 
California State University, Fullerton 
WELL KNOWN AS A PHILOSOPHER, Baruch Spinoza2 is virtually unknown as a 
scholar of language. Yet his fragmentary Compendium reveals insights into the 
nature, substance and structure of language that are still useful as modem 
linguists struggle with problems such as universality of grammar and the 
l. A version of this paper (with the title "Spinoza the Linguist") was presented lo a general 
linguistic audience al the 17th annual meeting of the Philological Association of the Pacific Coast, 
Linguistics section, UCLA, November IO, 1979. My thanks to those in attendance for much fruitful 
discussion. I wish also to record my gratitude to Donald A. Sears, the presiding officer of the 
section, Seija Tafoya, Robert Hetzron, Wolf Leslau, Seymour Menton. Alain Renoir, and Saul 
Levin for reading a preliminary version of the paper and for making useful suggestions, not all of 
which I have been able to follow. It must be noted, however, that none of these scholars can be 
blamed for any errors or infelicities, factual or otherwise. All those are my own. 
2. Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), or. as he later referred to himself, Benedictus (the Latin 
translation of Hebrew baruk ('blessed [m. sg.] 'l de Spinoza was born in Amsterdam. the Nether-
lands (see the excellent biography in Powell 1906, pp. 1-44). His parents had fled from Catholic 
persecution in the Iberian peninsula to Holland, known during this period for its liberal attitudes 
towards Jews. The family name. written as Espinoza. De Spinoza, D'Espinoza and Despinoza, 
probably indicates that Leon was the family's former homeland. Baruch 's grandfather was head of 
the Amsterdam Jewish community in 1628, and his father, Michael Espinoza, served as sexton of 
the synagogue at various times until Baruch 's eighteenth birthday. 
Spinoza received his early academic training under Saul Levi Monteira and Manasseh ben Israel 
(see Feuer, I 958, p. 6). Under these teachers he became familiar with the Bible and Talmud and 
their Hebrew and Aramaic commentaries, but more important for his own later career, with the 
philosophical and linguistic writings of Ibn Ezra and Maimonides. Although this educational 
experience was in Hebrew, Dutch. Spanish, and Portuguese (and perhaps also in Talmudic 
Aramaic), Spinoza turned his auention. through his polyglottic abilities, to the study of Latin, the 
universal language of European scholarship during the 17th century. 
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''nounness ''of a noun. 3 There can be no doubt that he is unknown as a linguist 
primarily because he is overshadowed by his very achievements in philosophy 
(for his place in European thought, see Roth, 1929, pp. 199-217). Indeed no 
one in the field of philosophy today can be considered thoroughly trained 
without having carefully studied his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, the 
Treatise on the Rainbow, the Ethics, and De lntellectus Emendatione. But very 
Although Dutch by birth, according to Dunner (1955, p. 5), he spoke and wrote Dutch with 
difficulty. Also, Kayser (1968, p. 199) reports that "Dutch was not his favorite language." 
Wienpahl ( l 979) has studied Spinoza's polyglottic background and abilities and concludes ( 1979. 
p. 37) that he spoke natively either Ladino or Portuguese. and as was then customary, Sephardic 
Jews who spoke Ladino or Portuguese wrote in Spanish. Spinoza 'sApology, written at the time of 
his excommunication (1656), was in Spanish. Wienpahl (1979, p. 38) also makes a good case that 
"Spinoza possibly often thought in Hebrew." Wolfson (1934, I, p. 9) reports that Spinoza also 
knew French, Flemish, German. and possibly Italian. Cf. the literature adduced therein (1934, I, p. 
54, fn. I). The reference to Porges (1924-1926, p. 146) has been unavailable. 
The journal Chronicon Spinozanum ( 1921-1927, The Hague) has proved difficult to obtain. 
Porges (1924-1926) is also cited by Parkinson ( 1969, p. 39) who also mentions Hillesum ( 1921 ), 
which I have not yet seen either. 
Spinoza mastered Latin quickly as he sought out a physician named Franz van den Ende, a 
scholar well versed in Copernicus, Galileo. Kepler, and Harvey, who supplemented his income, as 
was the fashion then, by tutoring Latin (he also taught Spinoza German and Greek). To a certain 
extent, Van den Ende exerted some atheistic leanings on Spinoza, which probably had an effect on 
Spinoza's later views. Spinoza was, as a result of these views, excommunicated from the Jewish 
community, but was readmitted to it three hundred years after his birth at a ceremony in Jerusalem. 
Spinoza, as a result of his study of Latin (later he also taught at Van den Ende 's "school"), 
became enthralled with traditional classical grammar (1 /a Varro, and the mastery of Latin acquired 
from Van den Ende allowed Spinoza the opportunity to read, for the first time, the entire realm of 
modern thinking on scientific subjects, including linguistics and philosophy, both represented then 
by the writings of Descartes. 
Chomsky ( 1966) reawakened the modern linguistic world to the general observations implicit in 
the writings of Descartes. Chomsky's position in the introduction ( 1966, p. I} may also be applied 
to the writings of Spinoza: 
The contributions to linguistic theory of an earlier European tradition have in general been of 
little interest to professional linguists, who have occupied themselves with quite different topics 
within an intellectual framework that is not receptive to the problems that gave rise to earlier 
linguistic study or the insights that it achieved; and these contributions are by now largely 
unknown or regarded with unconcealed contempt. 
As Chomsky proved for Cartesian linguistics ( 1966, pp. 33f) that deep structures and surface 
structures need not be identical, so too Spinoza worked with the same implicit doctrine. For the 
details, see note 16. 
3. Returning to previous workers in any field can be exciting since it is important, as a stategic 
task within linguistics. to see the historical evolution of ideas. Concerning this (seemingly 
unending) struggle, Roy Harvey Pearce said it well in his Presidential address to the Philological 
Association of the Pacific Coast, Seattle, 11November1978 (Pearce 1979, p. 65): "Ours remains 
at the very least the tremendous task of exegesis and analysis-scholarship and explication. And 
yet we must all strive to be interpreters too ... " 
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few scholars in modem linguistics, be it theoretical, philological or applied, 
have studied, in any detail, his Compendium Grammatices Linguae Hebraeae, 
only part of which has come down to us.4 It is my intention here to resurrect his 
name as a linguist, who combined polyglottism, philology, Biblical exegesis, 
and literary criticism with philosophy, much as Chomsky (1966) has created a 
rebirth of interest in the writings of a linguistic contemporary, Rene Descartes 
(1596-1650), for today's generation. 
Our discussion conveniently begins with the ''Admonition to the Reader'' 
of the Van Vloten and Land 1883 edition in the Opera Posthuma: 
The Compc11di11111 GrammaliCl's Linguae Hcbraeae which is here offered to 
you, kind reader, the author undertook to write at the request of certain of his 
friends who were diligently studying the Sacred Tongue, inasmuch as they 
recognized him rightly as one who had been steeped in it from his earliest youth, 
was diligently devoted to it for many years afterwards, and has achieved a 
complete understanding of the innermost essence of the language. 
All who are acquainted with this great man will cherish and revere this book, 
although like many of his other works, it is unfinished' because of the untimely 
death of the author. We present it to you in its incomplete state, kind reader. 
because we do not doubt that the author's and our effort will be of great benefit 
to you and quite worthy of study by you. 
The following points examine some of Spinoza's general linguistic insights 
and assumptions about language interpreted from his Grammar. 6 It is not 
feasible, due to the nature of this paper's focus, to comment on the Compen-
dium's position within the evolution of Hebrew grammatical tradition (i.e., lbn 
4. This work came to prominence two hundred and six years after his death in 1677. published 
in Van Vloten and Land (1883), originally published in 1677 (Nagelate Schriften). This work 
comprised the Ethica, Tractatus Politicus. and Tractatus de lnte!lectus Emendatione, his Letters. 
and finally theHebrell' Grammar under scrutiny here. The printing of the Opera Posthuma was one 
of the largest in the 17th century, according to Wienpahl ( 1979, p. 48). 
Spinoza's Ste/konstige reeckening mn den regenboorg and his Reeckening 1·a11 kanssen ap-
peared together ten years after his death. and the Korte l'erhandeling was lost until it was published 
in 1852. 
One must keep in mind that it was not until approximately 1795 that grammars were no longer 
being described in terms of all the grammatical categories of Latin (e.g., Murray, 1795). So 
Spinoza was "advanced" by more than a century in t~is regard. 
5. It appears that many parts of the manuscript were lost since Spinoza refers in many places. 
for example, to the section(s) on syntax. However, it is conceivable that the syntax portions were 
only partially completed. It is also possible that he burnt portions of the manuscript himself, since 
we know he did, in fact. bum (in 1677) his translation of the Pentateuch (see Dunner 1955, p. 34). 
6. I have used the translation and edition of Maurice J. Bloom ( 1962). and specific page 
citations of the Grammar refer to this volume. 
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Janah, Radaq, etc.), of which Spinoza was well aware, as were most other 
Sephardic Jewish scholars in Holland during this period. 
I. Phonology. A. General. All languages have a phonological opposition 
between consonant (called "letter") and vowel (p. 7).7 
The glottal stop, or Hebrew 'aleph, is called "the opening of the throat," 
which, technically speaking, refers to the glottis (i.e., the space between the 
vocal folds), and Spinoza states that "no other [sic] European language can 
explain (p. 8). "It seems more than likely that he was aware of the fact that most 
European languages do not have a separate grapheme for [ '], as does Hebrew 
'aleph or Arabic hamzah, although, of course, the glottal stop does occur in 
many European languages as a consonantal segment. Cf. North German Verein 
[feK'ain] ('organization, association'). 
Stop-spirant allophonics, so well known from classical Tiberian Hebrew, is 
correctly described since Spinoza calls, e.g., b, g, d, k, p, t (he uses the 
traditional grammarians' ordering of these consonants) without adages (i.e., 
the name of the grapheme which marks the stop variants), "weak," meaning 
v, y, l\ x, f, 8, respectively (pp. 8-9). 
Hebrew consonants are divided into gutturals, labials, dentals, linguals, 
and palatals as classification schema little changed down through the ages 
(p. IO). Although the term guttural has been abandoned in modern phonetics 
and phonology, there is still good cause to retain the concept in the sense, ar-
guing on (morpho-)phonological grounds, that ', ',h, h, andr do not geminate, 
but all the other consonants may. Most interesting to note here is that Jakobson, 
(1957 p. 105) marks for the Arabic dialect of the North Palestinian Druzes, 
', ', h, h as [ -consonantaij along with y and w. 
Vowel classification is handled in a modem framework because the sere, 
i.e., [ e], is defined as "a sound composed of[ a] and [i]," meaning it is a vowel 
equidistant between [a], a low front v6wel, and [i], a high front vowel, viz., it is 
a mid front vowel (p. 12). Further, a qames, the vowel usually transliterated as 
[::>] or /a/ or /a/, is called (p. 14) "a long and short vowel," which proves 
Spinoza's awareness of morphophonemic alternations. Thus Hebrew k::>I 
('each, every') <*kull kullll, butq::>m ('adversary') <*qam=llqamll· 8 Al-
though we might be attributing too much linguistic sophistication to him, no 
competent Hebrew grammarian would fail to see the rather numerous instances 
of what we caU morphophonemic alternations no matter what his theoretical 
inclinations or background in linguistic analysis. 
7. Of course in distinctive feature theory, all consonants are [+consonantal] and all vowels 
are [-consonantal). All known languages have contoids and vocoids, but some vocoids may 
function consonantally and vice 1•ersa. See Greenberg (1962) for details. 
8. This is a simplified statement as there is no need to enter into details for purposes of the 
presentation here. 
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B. Phonotactics. The principles of phonotactics and syllabication are well 
described as the intricacies of theshwa are discussed (pp. 15-17). For instance, 
no word in Hebrew can begin with a vowel or with two shwa' im as the 
vocalisms for the first two consonants or semi-consonants.9 Certain phonologi-
cal rules operate when two shwa' im theoretically come together in initial 
position, and when the shwa co-occurs with a "guttural" (p.17): "For their 
[i.e., shwa quiescens and mobile] usage is remarkable." 
C. Intonation. The importance of intonation in language is described 
accurately, 10 and the failure of written languages (Spinoza actually says "all 
languages" [p. 18]) to indicate the full range of intonation contrasts is iterated. 
He was also, as will soon become obvious, well aware of the significance of 
paralanguage and kinesics in human communication (a recently reborn topic 
within modern linguistics; cf. Kaye [ 1977]), as he discusses the interrelation-
ships of intonations and movements of the body, hands, eyelids, etc. It is fitting 
and proper to consider his exact words (p. 18): 
At first I was strongly of the opinion that their inventor [Hebrew accentuation 
graphemes] introduced them not only for the raising and lowering of the voice 
and to adorn speech but also to indicate animated expression which is usually 
produced by a change of voice, by the expression of the face, the movement of 
the body, the spreading of the hands, the winking of the eyes, the stamping of 
the feet, a curve of the mouth, a motion of the eyelids, spreading of the lips, and 
the various other gestures which aid a speaker to make clear his thoughts to his 
hearers. One tone of the voice expresses irony while another tone indicates 
simplicity. There is a tone in which we praise someone, still another for 
vituperation, and yet another for mockery. Thus we change our voice and 
expression for every emotion. 
D. Ablaut. Semitic apophony or ablaut is clearly defined as one considers 
examples such as diif?iir ('thing'), (pl.) d~arim, zikkiiron ('memory'), (pl.) 
zi~ronoJ, mele'fs, ('king'), (pl.) m;)/ii'fs,lm (p. 31 ). Spinoza states: "Thus the 
penultimate kametz ... is changed into a sheva ... But if the ultimate should 
be a kametz or a monosyllabic noun, then the kametz generally remains 
unchanged or sometimes changes into a patach." And (p. 32): 
The penultimate I.Sere also changes into a sheva, but before a cholem and a 
shurek it is retained ... Further, a noun whose last vowel is a tsere ... changes 
it into a sheva if the vowel antecedent to it is one of those which are always 
9. The only exception is the conjunction 'and,' which is u- before labials; elsewhere it is 
usually w;>-, but there are other morphophonemic intricacies which need not concern us here. 
10. Dwight Bolinger still is not 100 percent sure whether all languages have intonation. His 
conclusion is that probably all languages have intonation. See Bolinger (1978) for details. 
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retained in the plural or which are not changed into a sheva ... , 
but after a sheva or a syllable which is changed into a sheva, the tsere is 
retained ... 
E. Diachronics. Turning to diachronic matters, Spinoza is aware of the fact 
that historical reconstruction, both comparative and internal (remember Sir 
William Jones in 1787, 110 years after Spinoza's death!), must be of a 
phonemic rather than a phonetic nature, as he states (p. 13): "Whether in 
addition, they [the Hebrews] had others [phonemes and/or allophones] I am not 
able to say for certain, because for the most part we are ignorant of the manner 
of pronunciation of the ancients." On this Wolf (l 927, p. 159) comments: ''It 
was always his [i.e., Spinoza's] intention to publish a Hebrew Grammar 
demonstrated in the geometrical method, in the preface to which he would have 
shown that the correct pronunciation of this language had long ceased to be 
known .... '' 
The Massoretic intervention in the regularization process of archaic forms is 
noted as he (p. 85) compares the perfect, 2nd feminine singular ending -ti 
(Arabic -ti) with the statistically more favored form in -t: ''[They] ... have 
been corrected by the Massorites doubtless because they were obsolete." A 
properly archaic bound morpheme, on the other hand, such as -un in yluj;} '(m 
('they knew') is explained without reference to comparative-historical matters. 
It is handled strictly in synchronic (descriptive) terms. The -n is described as an 
aspect of paragogue, however, one may note the Arabic cognate -iin(a), the -n 
of which is not paragogic. 11 Similarly, the treatment of -in, imperfect, 2nd 
feminine singular, is handled in terms of paragogue (p. 87), whereas it is an 
archaic Semitic feature; cf. Arabic -ln(a). 12 From a synchronic and internal 
point of view, though, the -n may be called paragogic. 
Scribal error is recognized as one notes (p. 148) that a particular form in 
Jeremiah "seems to be a {sic) fault of a hasty pen." (The [sic] concerns the 
translation, as the problem would not appear in the Latin original. The trans-
lator had to make the choice of the definite or indefinite article in English, and in 
my view, made the wrong one.) Also (p. 87): "Finally in the case of Leviticus 
21 :5 I believe it to be a mistake of the copyist who wrote <qrhh> twice 
hastily." 
F. Morphophonemics. The automatic morphophonemic rule of vowel 
shortening as in diiqiir ('thing'), construct state daf!.ar, (pl.) daf!.iir1m is ex-
plained well (p. 68): 
11. In modern Arabic dialects. the reflex of classical Arabic -fm( a) is either -u, -o, -fm or -On. 
The -n is not paragogic. and its presence or absence, along with other morphological (and 
phonological) features, has been utilized to divide the modern sedentary dialects into Eastern vs. 
Western. 
12. The -11 is not present in all modern Arabic dialects. 
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The reason that vowels of the construct are not retained but are changed in 
various ways is that nouns contain at least one syllable and it is lengthened when 
it requires an accent. This is the special reason why vowels change to shorter 
ones when they add, in the plural, another long syllable with an accent ... " 
113 
The principle of compensatory lengthening is recognized (Spinoza calls it 
"change") as the definite article is either hii- or he- in non-geminatable 
environments (p. 14). As with all grammars, there are naive statements too; in 
this case ones concerning the definite article and the behavior of min ('from') 
before suffixes (p. 14): "If the antecedent vowel of the guttural letter to be 
doubled is a patach - then the dagesh point which should be inserted into a 
guttural letter is placed under the patach - and it becomes a kametz ... If it is a 
chirek, then the dot is added to it and it becomes a tsere Iikemehem in place of 
mihhem. '' But later (p. 15 ): '' ... the first thing that comes to mind is that a 
letter which is usually supplied by a dagesh may also be compensated by 
changing the preceding syllable from a short into a long one ... " 
II. General Principles of Language Design. A. Speech is primary. 
The primacy of speech over writing, or the fact that writing is a symboliza-
tion of a symbolization, clearly demonstrates the descriptive approach to 
language study (p. 18): "Nevertheless the originators of the letters in all 
languages failed to indicate these expressions in the written forms of speech. 
This is due to the fact that we can express our meaning much better orally than in 
writing.'' 
B. Language is rule-governed, but there exist exceptions to rules. That 
language is describable as rule-governed behavior is a basic premise for 
Spinoza, and he reacted strongly to the prescriptive linguistics of the times, as 
can be seen from the following (p. 18): 
The rules which are usually transmitted concerning the accents are more of a 
hindrance than an aid to students of the Hebrew language. They should be 
tolerated only if they facilitate a proper understanding of the pronunciation of 
the language. But if you should consult the experts they would all be forced to 
admit that they do not know the reason for so great a number of accents. 
These Massoretic rules for the accents began as descriptive ones, however, they 
are so complex that all students can readily sympathize with Spinoza's remarks 
(we can assume, therefore, that by Spinoza's time the rules for the accents were 
prescriptive and the system underlying them not understood by most scholars). 
As a further reaction against prescriptive linguistics, consider the following 
(p. 28): "Among the Latins speech is divided into eight parts, but it is doubtful 
if among the Hebrews it is divided into so many parts." 
114 ALAN S. KAYE 
It must be borne in mind that the (sometimes very forced) molding of 
various languages into the Latin grammatical model continued (perhaps one 
should say continues) through to the present, although it was the structural 
linguists, particularly in America, with their heavy anthropological back-
ground, who tried most vehemently (and succeeded in part) to end this common 
linguistic philosophy (the idea of eight parts of speech goes back to Dionysius 
Thrax). Like all grammars, however, Spinoza admits that language has excep-
tions to rules and hapax legomena. (Or, to paraphrase the Sapirian dictum, all 
grammars leak because languages are untidy systems.) In this connection, let us 
consider the following example from English. He would have probably desig-
nated English houses a hapax legomenon since it is the only word in the 
language which voices final -s, underlying 11-zll, before the plural suffix [-~z]. (I 
use this term, for lack of a better one, in a slightly different context from its 
normal philological sense.) Consider (p. 84): "Finally, the example in Ezra 
chapter 10: 17 [sic] [10: 16], where foqaryos occurs instead of li<fros ('to in-
quire'), which the grammarians note as an exception, to me seems as something 
strange and I do not venture to explain it.'' 
C. Deep Structure. One of Spinoza's most intriguing devices is his concept 
of deep or conceptual structure, which usually is associated with the linguistics 
of a much later period. It is proper to consider the exact wording (p. 28): 
For all Hebrew words, except for a few interjections and conjunctions and one 
or two particles, have the force and properties of nouns. Because the grammar-
ians did not understand this they considered many words to be irregular which 
according to the usage of the language are most regular, and they were ignorant 
of many things which are necessary to know for a proper understanding of the 
language. 
A noun is defined (p. 28) by Spinoza as "things and attributes of things, 
modes and relationships, or actions, and modes and relationships of actions." 
Examples, which are most interesting, include: 
being attributes: 
being modes: 
hii/Jiim ('learned') 
gii<Jol ('big'), 
hole~ ('going') 
yoqdi' ('knowing'), 
ben ('between') 
tahaJ ('under') 
'al ('above') 
The evidence from Hebrew alone indicates thattahaJ was originally a noun. 
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This is the view, e.g., of Koehler and Baumgartner (1958, p. 1026), who report 
the meaning 'the part underneath,' 'what is underneath,' '[at] the foot. '13 
The Hebrew evidence also suggests that ben was originally a noun meaning 
'interval' or 'distance' as in Neh 5:18, which developed into a preposition, 
and is still used as such in modern Hebrew. 14 
The suggestion has also been made that 'al ('above, on, upon') is derived 
from a non-attested noun *'ale, (pl.) 'alim ('height') (cf. Koehler and Baum-
gartner 1958, p. 703 and p. 706). 15 
13. Modern Standard Arabic has both, as doublet cognates: tahta ('under') as prepositi0n and 
tahtu as adverb, the latter being indeclinable. The frozen form with -u, also seen in Arabic mun /'j,, 
('since'), ba'du ('after'), qab/u ('before'), etc., points to the fact that most prepositions in Arabic 
were originally nouns in the status construct us. 
Hebrew and Aramaic fa-= Arabic ka- ('as, like'), is usually seen as a functioning preposition as 
well, but has also been regarded as a noun. Cf. Wright (1859, p. 280, REM. C): "It is a formally 
undeveloped noun, which occurs only as the governing word in the genitive construction, but runs 
in this position through all the relations of case (similitudo, instar)." 
14. The comparative evidence suggests that bayn was a noun. Cf. classical Arabic baynun 
('interval, separation'), a regular (triptote) noun. The cognate is used as the preposition for 
'between, among' in Ugaritic (as well as bnt), Ethiopic, Aramaic, Epigraphic South Arabian, and 
Soqotri, and there are details in those languages which point to its nominal origin, such as the verbal 
extension of this root meaning 'understand' <'bridge the gap between,' which are omitted here. 
15. Unfortunately, although the cognate root occurs with the same meaning in Ugaritic, 
Phoenician, Aramaic, and Arabic, there is no concrete evidence in any of these languages to support 
the contention under discussion. 
It is tempting to connect the Hebrew doublet 'die ('on) with the root '/y ('go up') with nominal 
force. On the problem see Haupt (1906). The opposite hypothesis, viz., particles derived from 
verbs, could also be entertained. There is also, though, in classical Arabic, an unattested *'a/un 
('height') in min 'a/u ('above'). Cf. Wright (1859, p. 288, §363). 
An interesting proof for the hypothesis that prepositions "are nouns which indicate the 
relationship of one individual to another" is seen in the fact that certain prepositions take plural 
nominal suffixes (p. 58). To quote from Spinoza (p. 58): "The first statement, namely that I believe 
that prepositions are nouns, is based on the two previous chapters. But that prepositions should 
occur in the plural also might perhaps appear absurd to many; but why should they not, since they 
are also nouns?" 
His reasoning is explicated as he continues: 
Although prepositions cannot indicate many relationships simultaneously, nevertheless they 
are inflected from singular to plural in the absolute state as well as the construct state; but 
prepositions in the absolute state are only relationships of themselves, abstractly conceived and 
not expressed; but then they express not so much the relationship as the place or time with 
relation to something. 
Examples cited to prove the hypothesis include: ben ('between'), (pl.) benoJ (cf. the parallel 
development in Nigerian Arabic (am)benat ['between1, the -at of which is the f. pl. ending, a 
morphological doublet to bi!n), 'tihor ('posterior, backwards'), (pl.) 'dhortm, 'ahar ('after'), 
'ahdre ('much after'), 'e/~'ete ('to'), 'al~'dle ('above'), 'a<f-'(uje ('until'), and lipne ('be-
fore ')<panlm ('face') (a plural noun), from *pane, perhaps relatable to pe ('mouth').-
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Later, one is reminded of the primacy of the noun as the heart (i.e., central 
ingredient) of linguistic structure (p. 50): ''For nobody will be able to cultivate 
this language profitably, unless he rightly learns . . . that the verbs, the 
participles, the prepositions and the adverbs among the Hebrews are all pure 
unmixed Nouns." 
A modem-day linguist writing along similar lines is Wallace L. Chafe (in 
many publications but particularly in his influential book, 1970). He explains 
( 1970, pp. 96-97) that the entirety of the human conceptual universe is divided 
initially into the verb (states, conditions, qualities, events) and the noun 
(objects and abstractions). The fact that he gets away from defining a noun in 
terms of a' 'thing'' is quite significant. Indeed almost all grammarians for many 
a century define a noun in terms of the concept of "thing." For instance, 
Nesfield (1898) states a noun to be "a word used for naming anything" and 
notes that "thing" used in the definition is person, place, quality, action, 
feeling, etc. 
Rather than assuming the noun to be central, Chafe picks the verb (of course 
he has evidence for so doing, viz., the semantic interpretation of sentences such 
as ''The chair laughed.''), although, he does admit (1970, p. 96) that utterances 
which semantically and syntactically have no verb, like Oh! or Ouch! are to be 
regarded as vestiges of prehuman communication (this is a very important and 
neglected area in studies concerning linguistic evolution). 
Chafe 's semantic model for language structure is the direct opposite of 
Chomsky (1965) and Fillmore (1968), i.e., Chafe takes the position that the 
verb dictates or' 'pre-determines" the noun whereas Chomsky argues, e.g., for 
the reverse, as Spinoza hypothesized centuries earlier. 16 
The idea that prepositions derive from nouns is known from other languages too, e.g .. Ateso 
(spoken in Uganda). where one can freely do so by dropping the noun prefix. See Hilders and 
Lawrence (1957, p. 66). 
Finnish is also another example of a language in which (some) post-positions (prepositions) 
derive ultimately from nouns. Thus from the noun piiii ('head'), the following are derivatives 
thereof: piiiille ('to [the top ot], on'), piiiiltii ('from [the top ot] '), piiiistii ('after'), piiin ('toward, 
against"). and piiitse ('through, by'). See ltkonen and Joki (1962, pp. 688f). Native speakers do not 
associate these postpositions with the root 'head.' Thanks to Seija Tafoya for supplying this 
information and for the Finnish data in note 25. 
16. It is not within the scope of this paper to decide if Chafe is right and Chomsky wrong. I 
merely want to show Spinoza as a generative-transformationalist in a restricted sense, although 
some of his statements make him lean more towards a generative semantics than a generative 
(interpretive) syntax. 
For his general theory of language, particularly as it concerns rationalistic philosophy, Savan 
(1972, p. 236) related the importance of language in Spinoza's writings: 
In his recent and lucid exposition of Spinoza, Mr. Stuart Hampshire [Spinoza, London, 1951] 
points out that Spinoza hoped to emulate the example of the geometers in freeing language ofits 
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D. Analogy. Linguistic analogy is discussed (p. 124) in terms of verbal 
morphology. For instance, liiqah ('he took') in the imperfect works like niiJan 
('he gave') in the assimilation of a liquid, viz., yitten and yiqqah, respectively: 
''Since verbs whose primary root letter is <n>, are generally defective verbs 
(as I shall show below) it seems that these verbs imitate [emphasis mine) other 
defective verbs." 
Spinoza even uses the term (p. 124): '' ... atone time follow this mode and 
at other times follow the sixth conjugation in accordance with linguistic 
analogy ... " 
III. Grammar. A. Free Variation. Morphemic free variation is recognized 
in Spinoza's discussion of number, e.g., hekii!Ot-hekiilim ('temples') (p. 30). 
B. Dual. Language change is described as an occurring reality in the 
discussion of the dual. Consider (p. 35): " ... it is not now permissable to use 
this ending [-ayim] to indicate the dual number ... " 
In modem (Israeli) Hebrew, the dual form still survives although it is quite 
unproductive (whereas in modern Arabic dialects it is very productive for nouns 
but no longer survives in the pronoun, verb, and adjective). Basically. in 
modem Hebrew it survives in body parts occurring in natural pairs and other 
Biblical-type morphemes such as moz~nayim ('scales '). 17 Cf. the descriptive 
adequacy of Spinoza's (p. 35): '· ... things which are naturally dual or which 
consist of two parts . . . '' 
intimate connection with the imagination so that it might be employed to express clearly and 
distinctly the idea of a true philosophy. Spinoza's interest in language and in the bearing of 
language upon philosophy is. however. considerably more important in the shaping of his 
thought and writings than Hampshire indicates. It is not just that Spinoza wrote a lreatise on a 
natural language, or that nearly every one of his writings attempts some analysis of language 
and mathematics. Nor is it just that he experimented with a variety of literary forms in the 
exposition of his thought. using dialogue, autobiography, aphorism. historical and Biblical 
criticism, as well as the method of geometrical demonstration. Nor again is it just that he 
occasionally formulates philosophical theses in syntactical terms. It is also that Spinoza holds 
that both language and mathematics are fundamentally inadequate to the formulation or direct 
expression of philosophical truths. 
Other linguists have, in a different framework. argued for noun centrality as well. Greenberg 
(I 978b, p. 78), e.g., states: " ... we see from this why it is the noun par excellence which gives 
rise to dassificational systems of syntactic relevance." 
I interpret Spinoza's remarks, throughout the work. as arguments in favor of noun centrality 
(e.g .. the remark from p. 50. or the following [p. 52): · · ... prepositions. as we have already said 
indeed they are nouns . "). 
17. The form mitp~rayim ('shears'), cited by Spinoza. is not Biblical. The Editor's note 
"Thus in the Holy Scriptures, but it should be mitp~rayim ·· is inexplicable. 
On duality and especially for the term pseudo-dual, see Blanc (1970). and on Hebrew 
particularly, see p. 54 and the references in note 38. 
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C. Common Gender. The idea of a common gender is proposed for nouns 
which are both masculine and feminine, e.g., klmiip ('wing'), and for pronouns 
(p. 61), i.e., 'ani-'ano~i ('I'), 'iinahnu-'anu-rzahn[i ('we'), although the 
reasoning behind the idea is basic (" ... because speech itself indicates 
sufficiently whether it is masculine or feminine"). 
D. Adverb as Noun. A major proof for the adverb's being, in essence, also 
a noun is not adduced in the Grammar. In the classical Semitic languages, 
generally, it is the noun in the accusative case (of which there are only remnants 
in Hebrew) which is adverbial. For instance, hinnam ('gratuitously')<hen 
('charm, grace ')<*hinn, or 'omniim ('really') <'omen ('faithfulness, truth') 
( 'faith 1). It can probably be safely assumed that the above data were known 
to Spinoza. Concerning adverbs, though, he does note (p. 60) that many 
involve reduplication, e.g., m;;,'m ('fewness, [the] few') but m;;,'a_t m;;,'at 
('gradually, little by little'). (On reduplication in terms of morphology in 
general, cf. Key, 1965 and Winter, 1970.) 
Although we might possibly be attributing knowledge to Spinoza which he 
did not possess, there is a good parallel in the many non-Semitic languages 
which have borrowed a substantial number of nouns in the accusative singular 
from classical Arabic, which native speakers perceive by the ending -an, as 
underlying ad verbs (or adverbials) (cf. Hebrew -am), e.g., Persian musallaman 
or hatman ('certainly'), haqiqatan ('really'), etc. In fact, native speakers of 
Farsi who are well educated associate this adverbial ending with the morphog-
rapheme < '>, even in the last example cited above, i.e., l-..::..;.. and 
therefore \ ··. i .: G> , although from the classical Arabic point of view, this 
orthography is erroneous (it is ·.;, i .! i > , with ta' marbu_tah ! ) . 
E. pqd and Root Structure. Verbal morphology is described in terms of 
seven infinitives with the root pqd ('to take care of') (traditional Hebrew 
grammar uses the rootp'l ['to do, make 1, borrowed from Arabic grammatical 
thought). The reason for a new paradigm root is, in our view, due to the fact that 
the rootpqd is actually attested in the Bible in all seven basic conjugations or 
themes (Hebrew binyanim), whereas p'l is not. This translates into the fact that 
Spinoza was a descriptivist and a realist not in favor of abstracts and could not 
bring himself to cite verbal categories from an existent root not occurring in 
most of the binyanim. In fact,p'/ occurs in only one of the seven! 18 
Spinoza (pp. 146-147) emphatically rejected anything but a triconsonantal 
root for Hebrew stating that quadriconsonantal roots were offshoots from them 
18. The meanings of pqd in the various themes are not in accordance with classical Hebrew 
(pp. 75- 76), however, the morphology is correct. Also, the familiarity with other Hebrew 
grammars probably influenced Spinoza's decision to abandon the rootp'l. 
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via reduplication and other morphological processes. For instance, frfr 
('chain') can be derived from srS ('root'). 
Spinoza actually uses serd ('eradicate') and qrqr ('demolish a wall ')<qlr 
('wall'). The Spinoza text states (p. 146): "But, without conjecturing about 
this, let us state this in general that there has been no verb observed which, 
because of the characterisitics of the verb form, the tense, or the person, 
consists of more than three root letters ... " 
The conjugational terms qal, nip'al, and pi'el do not occur in the work, 
but hof!'al, hitpa'el, and hotpa'a( do, according to remarks made by the 
Editor. The status of hip' ii (p. 97), according to the editorial notation, is rather 
unclear. No reasons are adduced regarding the apparent inconsistencies in the 
choice of terminology. 
F. Tense vs. Aspect. The (seemingly) never-ending problem in Hebrew 
(and in Semitic, for that matter) of tense vs. aspect is handled by postulating a 
past and a non-past (called "present/future") category. Modern treatises are 
still divided on the question, yet Hetzron (in preparation)19 opts also for a 
19. Hetzron (in preparation) argues that the aspectual terminology is based on different 
interpretations and assumptions and funher, the idea of tense does not have to correspond with 
prevailing notions of time. Most relevant to note is that B. Whorf, who wrote extensively about the 
linguistic expression of TIME and its reality in language, turned his attention to the study of Hebrew 
in 1924, and was greatly influenced by Fabre d'Olivet (1815-16), an encyclopaedic magnum 
opus of this giant French philologist ( 1768-1825). For details concerning Wharf's study of Fabre 
d'Olivet's Hebrew Grammar, see Carroll (1956, pp. 7-9). Incidentally, Fabre d'Olivet (1815-16, 
I, p. 97) maintained that the noun is the basis of language and the verb is formed from the noun. 
Looking for a glimpse into Spinoza's philosophical foundations of tense and time, I could find 
no linguistic relevance in Hardin (1978), who does discuss the Wolfsonian dichotomy of the 
Platonic and Aristotelian senses of "eternity" (the first excluding time). Cf. Wolfson (1934) and 
Hallett ( 1957). On the differences between Spinoza and Descartes on time, cf. Alexander (1972). 
There is a hint that Spinoza conceived of linguistic relativity= determinism= the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis. According to Wienpahl (1979, p. 38): ''Spinoza himself tells a correspondent that the 
latter has misunderstood a passage in John 'because you measure the phrases of oriental languages 
by European modes of speaking'." We also learn from Wienpahl (1979, p. 48): 
Spinoza's interest in the [Hebrew] language was both deep and general. It was not an interest 
only in a bridge to the Old Testament. He was concerned, as comes out in the Tractatus 
Theo/ogico-Politicus, with things that the language had done to the thinking of the ancient 
Hebrews as they formed their ideas. 
And (1979, p. 106): '" ... his thinking [viz., Spinoza's) requires basic changes in the grammar 
we inherited from Aristotle ... which makes it apparent thatSpinoza' s thinking not only required a 
different grammar. but that it was based on a different one" [emphasis mine; cf. the parallel to 
Wharf's SAE= Standard Average European). 
For discussion of Spinoza's use of the terms "substance" and "attribute" as "linguistic 
devices partly as a result of his philological and philosophical study of the Hebrew language," cf. 
Wienpahl (1979, p. 75). 
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past/non-past rather than a perfect(ive)/imperfect(ive). Spinoza's text is quite 
intriguing in this regard (p. 77): 
.. because I write largely for those who are versed in other languages, 1 refrain 
from explaining what tense is and what mode is, but I will show only that which 
among the Hebrews is unusual in this respect. 
The Hebrews usually refer actions to no other time than to paq and the 
future. The reason for this seems to be that they acknowledge only these two 
divisions of time, and that they consider the present tense only as a point, that is 
as the end of the past and beginning of the future. I say they viewed time to be 
like a line consisting of many points each of which they considered the end of 
one part and the beginning of another. 
G. Markedness. The third masculine singular of the perfect (past) is rightly 
seen as the unmarked stem (p. 77): " ... it never has the sign of person.'' 
IV. Influence on Spinoza. There is some indication that Spinoza was 
influenced, to a certain extent, by the Cartesian view that the grammar of a 
language is a theory of that language, the purpose for which is to account for an 
infinite number of possible grammatical sentences not being confined only to 
those sentences as actually found in a fixed corpus, such as the Hebrew Bible 
(p. 96): "To be sure, as we have said, they [i.e., the Classical grammarians] 
wrote a grammar of the Scriptures, not of the language. " 20 
V. Conclusion. I have endeavored to glean some of the general linguis-
tic methodology and theory implicit in Spinoza's Hebrew Grammar, and since 
I cannot assume that most linguists have a good command of Hebrew, I 
must reiterate Spinoza's words (p. 148): "I do not wish to weary the students 
[with details] ... "It should be clear at this stage that this work consists of 
much more than language-specifics and has wider applications than straight 
linguistic philology. It is best viewed as the product of a 17th-century mind 
which had talent for grammar, i.e., universal grammar. 
20. This is discussed in Wienpahl (1979. pp. 48-49). It is incomprehensible why the author 
states: " ... all the words in the (Hebrew] language (with a few exceptions made by later 
grammarians) were originally verbs (sic].'· 
There can be no doubt that Spinoza read Cartesianism (in Latin and/or Dutch) as is illustrated by 
careful scrutiny of Discourse on Method, the Meditations with the Objections and Replies, the 
Principles of Phi/osophr, the Passions of the Soul, and the Letters. Leon Roth concludes ( 1924, pp. 
9- 11) that Spinoza was not a Cartesian, and calls into question the Leibniz doctrine that ''Spinoza 
only cultivated certain seeds of Descartes' philosophy." Kayser ( 1968) is particularly good 
concerning the relationship between Spinoza and Leibniz. Very valuable for the scientific method 
of explaining Spinoza's philosophy is Bidney (1940, pp. 1-19). 
Many aspects of rationalism may have been discussed in detail in the syntax portion(s) of the 
Grammar which, as has already been mentioned, has (have) not survived. See further note 5. 
On Spinoza as a linguistic theoretician, see Fl9istad (1969, p. 50). 
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The idea of noun centrality or verb centrality, discussed earlier, is an 
important topic within linguistics and deserves closer examination (very little 
previous work has been accomplished here). Some languages like Tagalog and 
Nootka apparently have no nouns, but all languages have the category Noun 
Phrase (see Bach, 1974, p. 286). 21 The idea of tense is usually rest1icted to a 
discussion of the verb; yet why not talk about tense in the noun too? By this we 
are saying that there exists evidence for the view that the noun/verb dichotomy 
is, on a deep level, artificial and perhaps should be abandoned. Consider that 
fiancee is future tense, ex- marks the past as ex-<·on, ex-wife, etc., and grand-
father is pluperfect. 22 
Gardiner ( 1951 , pp. 9- I 0) chastises Antoine Meillet for his definition of a 
noun with reference to things (in the latter's Linguistique historique et linguis-
tique genera le). He states (1951, p. 9): "All words whatsoever will be seen to 
be the names of 'things,' that term being understood in the very widest sense as 
covering material objects, persons, actions, relations, concepts, and figments 
of the imagination.'' Later ( 1951 , p. 10) Gardiner tells us that ''the terms 'verb' 
and 'noun' are not really incompatible.'' Perhaps words such as 'round '23 
functioning as noun (Give me another round!), adjective (a round ball), verb (to 
round the Hom), preposition (round the mulberry bush), and adverb (Make it go 
round!) will shed new light on the problem of the parts of speech, universal 
grammar, and their validity as grammatical categories for future theories of 
grammar. It may also help us to understand the development of pre-language as 
a closed-call system of communication to an open-call system of true language 
with productivity and duality of patterning since primate closed-call communi-
cation involves sememes of the noun-inherent type, i.e., calls for danger, 
hunger, mother-child contact, territorial integrity, etc. Moreover, the fact that 
children first learn nouns rather than verbs is more interesting evidence in favor 
of the centrality of the noun ("mama," "dada," "kitty," etc.). 24 Further, is 
21. Stockwell says (1977, p. 52): ""The two basic building blocks of all sentences in all 
languages are verbs and nouns.·' Further ( 1977, p. 55 ): .. All languages are therefore very rich in 
devices to stipulate the reference of nouns ... ·' Quite interesting to note here also is Cowper and 
Kimura ( 1979). 
22. Mentioned, but without any references, in Palmer (1971, p. 39). Cf. \\'011/d-be ... , -to-be 
and ... -elect, and one can even elicit NP's in English such as ex-ll'ife-to-be. 
23. Palmer (1971, p. 69). 
24. This has been the case with our two children. Others, however, who have studied the 
language acquisition process, have reported that so-called adjectives such as 'hot' were the first 
words actually produced (and not passively understood). Although 'hot' is, technically speaking, 
an adjective, in child language it is better regarded as a noun, i.e., hot thing or thing which is hot 
(viz., as a substantive). 
There remain some thorny problems of interpretation. For instance, when our son uttered [bwa 
bwa], roughly translatable as ''I want it now'·', it was impossible to figure out whether the utterance 
was a noun, i.e., food. cheese, orange-juice bar. etc .. or whether it was more verb-like, i.e., I \\'ant. 
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the crucial fact that when English speakers are confronted with the horrible 
reality of a fire (i.e., the call for "danger" in primate systems which are 
closed-call), "Fire!" (a noun) is the signal rather than anything resembling a 
verb. 25 But as Spinoza states many times in his Compendium (p. 7, 
p. 94, and passim): ''But of this enough!'' The purpose of this paper has been to 
show the relevance of our predecessors to current problems - to resurrect the 
best-known and least-read grammarian/philologist and now linguist of the 17th 
century. 
Give me!, lneed, or something of the sort. Detailed investigation is necessary. '' ... More abstract 
words such as adjectives are acquired later,'' says Moskowitz (1978, p. 6). Research cited therein 
reports further that a newly acquired word at the one-word stage of development is first used for 
naming something, i.e., the interpretation is that it is a noun. 
25. A cross~ultural study would be useful. I know of none. But I can report the results of a 
preliminary study of how various languages express the horrible danger of a (spreading) fire. Only 
three languages (Mandarin, Amoy Chinese, and Navajo) were found which use a device other than 
the pure noun 'fire', although Finnish uses a noun+ adverb (note no verb) construction: [tuli:rti)< 
tuli ('fire') +irti ('loose'). In Saudi-Arabian Arabic 'fire', [hariga) is utilized but with a very long 
riJ. In Persian 'fire' [atg)>[atl~] with elongated [i), however, in Spanish the reverse phenome-
non of vowel shortening takes place, viz., [fweyo) ('fire'); the ultrashort vowels, with high pitch 
on the first and low pitch on the second, help to indicate the very dangerous situation of a spreading 
(emergency, i.e., immediate danger) fire. Modern Israeli Hebrew is an example of a language in 
which both options of extra-vowel lengthening or ultra-vowel shortening take place, viz., [sref:\] or 
[srefii). Many native speakers consulted rejected one of them in favor of the other, however. In 
Mandarin Chinese, a verb is utilized, viz., [<si hwS la), lit., 'is out of control' - 'fire' -
'exclamatory particle', whereas in Amoy Chinese the following occurs, also with a verb: [he ~jw 
tsu Io), lit., 'fire' - 'bum' - 'house' - 'exclamatory particle'. Very similar is Navajo in 
which one says [howan tila), lit., 'house is burning.' One cannot help notice the paralinguistic 
changes for the word 'fire' in this context in languages, which probably have their roots in 
prehuman speech. 
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